

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ARAE-00 SS-15 SP-02 MMS-01 PM-03 L-03

EB-07 CU-02 INR-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 ACDA-05 AGR-05

AID-05 COME-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 OPIC-03 PC-01 PER-01

TRSE-00 USIA-06 /083 W

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P 051400Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7135

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MANAGUA 2149

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NU

SUBJECT: NICARAGUA CASP

REF: STATE 113183

1. EMBASSY APPRECIATES THE ATTENTION THAT THE PRE-IG PANELISTS HAVE DEVOTED TO MANAGUA'S CASP SUBMISSION. OBVIOUSLY, THE REVIEW OF THE CASP ON THIS OCCASION HAS BEEN INSOME DEPTH AND HAS UNEARTHED SOME SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EMBASSY COUNTRY TEAM (CT) AND WASHINGTON. WHILE THE CT HOPES THAT WASHINGWI WILL APPRECIATE ITS CONCERN THAT SOME OF OUR ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WERE IN CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF THE PRE-IG WE WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY THIS PRESENTS TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE HOPEFUL
LY

OUT OF WHICH WILL EMERGE A SYNTHESIS OF VIEWS WHICH WILL PROVE AS USEFUL AND VALID IN PRACTICE AS IT LOOKS GOOD ON PAPER.

2. IF WE MAY BRIEFLY ENCAPSULATE OUR DIFFERENCES AS EXPRESSED IN REFTTEL AND IN THE CONSOLIDATED CHANGE SHEET, WE BELIEVE THAT THEY LIE PRINCIPALLY IN THE AREAS OF (A) THE RELATIVE WEIGHT GIVEN TO NICARAGUA'S EXTERNAL VS. INTERNAL BEHAVIOR AS THEY CONCERN OUR INTERESTS HERE, AND (B) THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE CAN OR OUGHT TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO AFFECT DECISIONS IN THESE RESPECTIVE SPHEREES.

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WE CONCLUDE THIS AFTER NOTING THAT THE PRE-IG RELEGATED NICARAGUAN

FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. BUSINESS INTEREST TO A LOWER ECHELON OF CONCERN WHILE LEAVING INTACT OUR REGARD FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE PANEL'S REFORMULATION OF THE FIRST (AND ONLY) ISSUE BUTTRESSES THIS APPROACH BY SUGGESTING THAT WE OUGHT TO PROMOTE INTERNAL POLITICAL CHANGE WITHOUT REGARD TO ANY OTHER OBJECTIVE. THE PRE-IG, BY SHUFFLING THE ORDER OF ASSUMPTIONS, ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAVE THE LEVERAGE TO AFFECT POLITICAL CHANGES, WHILE, CONVERSELY, IT REJECTED THE NOTION THAT WE HAVE SUFFICIENT INFLUENCE TO AFFECT FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS WITHOUT MUCH RISK.

3. A. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: BEFORE GETTING TO THESE KERNELS OF OUR DIVERGENCE, WE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO DISPOSE OF A STYLISTIC PROBLEM IN WASHINGTON'S APPROACH, THAT OF LUMPING THE INTERNAL POLITICAL AND THE FOREIGN POLICY TOGETHER IN A SINGLE ISSUE. WHILE THERE IS OBVIOUSLY SOME LINKAGE, THE TWO ARE ESSENTIALLY DISTINCT AS TO THE CHALLENGES PRESENTED, THE DEPTH AND LEGITIMACY OF OUR CONCERN AND THE TACTICS NEEDED TO PRODUCE RESULTS. THERE IS AS MUCH LOGIC COMBINING THESE TOGETHER AS THERE IS TO BLEND IN THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SEGMENTS, AND IF WE ARE GOING TO SUCCEED IN TREATING THE NUB OF OUR DIFFERENCES, WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THEY BE SEPARATED.

4. WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO THE REFORMULATION OF THE FIRST ISSUE, WASHINGTON APPARENTLY DOES NOT SHARE THE SAME CONCERN ABOUT THE NECESSITY TO DEVISE A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH TO FIT GENERAL GUIDELINES. (WE ARE GRATIFIED, HOWEVER, THAT WASHINGTON HAS NOT TAKEN ANY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE WITH ANY OF THE CT'S POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS PORTION, INDICATING A WELCOME UNANIMITY ABOUT HOW WE SHOULD GO ABOUT OUR BUSINESS HERE, IF NOT ABOUT TO WHAT END.) THE CT FELT THAT ALTHOUGH THE SPECIFIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS WERE THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE, THE WAY THE PROBLEM WAS FORMULATED IMPARTED A NECESSARY COHERENCE TO THE WHOLE EXERCISE. WE SOUGHT AN AUTOMATIC REFERENCE WITH WHICH TO INFORM OUR ACTIVITIES HERE WHICH WOULD REFLECT OUR BELIEF THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAD LITTLE CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN THE PRESENT INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION WITH STRICT REGARD TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS, THERE WERE SEEDS OF MIDDLE AND LONG-TERM PROBLEMS IN THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT WHICH COULD HAUNT US IF NOT HANDLED WISELY. WHILE WE STILL ARE NOT FULLY
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SATISFIED WITH THE PHRASING OF OUR PROPOSITION, WE BELIEVE IT WAS AT LAST SERVICEABLE IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM. ON THE OTHER HAND, WASHINGTON'S FORMULATION IS MORE OF A RHETORICAL CATCH-ALL WHICH DOES NOT HAVE THE UTILITARIAN PURPOSE INTENDED.

5. WE ALSO OBJECT TO THE CHANGED WORDING IN THE STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND TO THE REVISED JUXTAPOSITION OF THE ASSUMPTIONS WHICH SUGGESTS A GREATER CAPABILITY OF THE U.S. TO AFFECT THE NICARAGUAN

INTERNAL POLITICAL PROCESS THAN WAS THE INTENTION OF THE CT. AS
WE HAVE LEARNED, SOMETIMES BITTERLY, IN THE PAST SEVERAL DECADES (BOT
H
HERE AND ELSEWHERE), OUR ABILITY TO AFFECT THIS SPHERE ALTHOUGH IT MA
Y
BE SIGNIFICANT IN A FAVORABLE CONFLUENCE OF PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES,
REMAINS ESSENTIALLY LIMITED. ONE ONLY HAS TO REFER AS FAR BACK AS LAS
T
YEAR'S CASP WHEN UNREALISTICALLY AMBITIOUS OBJECTIVES IN THIS AREA CAM
E
TO NAUGHT DESPITE THE CONSIDERABLE LEVERAGE WE ENJOYED BY MEANS OF
OUR RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. WITH PROGRESSIVELY DIMINISHED
AID LEVERAGE TO USE AS AN INSTRUMENT, ANY PROPOSITION
WHICH HINTS THAT WE CAN EFFECT IMPORTANT CHANGES IS AN EXERCISE IN
SELF-DECEPTION. THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY SOME WAYS THAT E CAN
CONTRIBUTE, AS DELINEATED IN THE ASSUMPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
BUT WE PREFER TO TREAT THIS SUBJECT IN A MUCH LOWER-KEY THAN THE
PRE-IG. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF OUR ABILITY TO AFFECT INTERNAL

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EB-07 CU-02 INR-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 ACDA-05 AGR-05

AID-05 COME-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 OPIC-03 PC-01 PER-01

TRSE-00 USIA-06 /083 W

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P 051400Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7136

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MANAGUA 2149

POLITICS IS RATHER LESS THAN WASHINGTON THINKS, OUR ABILITY TO DO SO
IN FOREIGN POLICY, AS WILL BE DISCUSSED LATER, IS MORE.

6. THE PRE-IG PANELISTS SEEMED TO HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN
ACCEPTING THE EXPLICIT PROPOSITION THAT OUR INTEREST IN INTERNAL
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WAS GEARED TO U.S. INTERESTS (FOSTERING

OF PRO-U.S. GOVERNMENTS IN THIS CASE). IN DECIDING TO PHRASE THE POLITICAL ISSUE IN THESE TERMS, THE CT REFLECTED SOME DISQUIET ABOUT THE QUESTION OF THE LEGITIMACY OF OUR ATTENTION TO NICARAGUAN INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEBATED AT LENGTH HOW TO JUSTIFY IT IN TERMS OF U.S. INTERESTS. WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT IN VIEW OF THE MOTTLED HISTORY OF U.S. INTERVENTION HERE, WE SHOULD HAVE IT CLEARLY SAMPTED IN OUR OWN MINDS THAT WE ARE NOT CONCERNED WITH INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR CAPRICIOUS, ROMANTIC OR MISSIONARY MOTIVES. BY FAILING TO LINK THE QUESTION WITH U.S. INTERESTS, THE PRE-IG FLIRTS WITH ENCOURAGING PRECISLY THESE SAME MISTAKEN NOTIONS ABOUT OUR MOTIVATIONS. WE SUGGEST AS COMPROMISE LANGUAGE: "WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE U.S. PLAY IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN ORDER TO INSURE OUR LONGTERM INTERESTS?"

7. B.FOREIGN POLICY: WHILE WE FELT THAT U.S. ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, HOWEVER MARGINALLY AFFECTED HERE, DESERVED A PLACE IN THE FIRST LINE OF INTERESTS, FOR PRINCIPLE IF NOTHING ELSE, WE DEFER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE REPRESENTATIVE'S ACQUIESCENCE AT THE
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PRE-IG. HOWEVER, THE CT ARGUES STRONGLY AGAINST DOWN-GRADING THE FOREIGN POLICY FACTOR IN OUR RELATIONS HERE. OF THE TANGIBLE BENEFITS WHICH WE DERIVE FROM OUR PREDOMINANCE HERE, THIS IS BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE WHICH ENHANCES THE VALUE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ABOVE ALL OTHERS. AND WHEN CONSIDERING THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR POLITICAL DABBING HERE, THIS IS THE PAY-OFF THAT MOST OF US HAVE IN MIND. WITH THE NUMBER OF HARDCORE U.S. SUPPORTERS IN WORLD FORUMS RADICALLY DIMINISHED IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, IT SEEMED PATENT TO US THAT THE VALUE OF THOSE REMAINING, LIKE NICARAGUA, HAS INCREASED. THIS SITUATION SEEMS BOTH WORTH PRESERVING AND WORTH FRETTING OVER AS A PRIMARY INTEREST. ADDITIONALLY, GIVEN SOMOZA'S SENIOR STATESMAN STATUS WITH A MORE CLUBBY CENTRAL AMERICAN GROUP, PLUS THE POSSIBILITY THAT NICARAGUA WILL REMAIN AS ONE OF THE LAST TARGETS OF REVOLUTIONARY OPPORTUNITY FOR CUBA CONTINUE TO PERSUADE US THAT THE INTERNATIONAL ITEM IS AN IMPORTANT INTEREST FOR US WHETHER SUCH TERM IS DEFINED AS AN OBJECT WARRANTING ATTENTION OR AS A BENEFIT. DESPITE THE INSERTION BY WASHINGTON OF LANGUAGE MEANT TO DETRACT FROM ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE SUMMARY OF LONG-TERM INTERESTS, THE PROMINENCE AND ATTENTION ACCORDED TO NICARAGUA FOREIGN POLICY THEREIN SEEM TO CONTRADICT WASHINGTON'S RELUCTANCE TO GIVE IT APPROPRIATE RECOGNITION ELSEWHERE.

8. THE CT RECOGNIZES THAT WHETEHR OR NOT EXPECTED CHALLENGES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SPHERE CONSTITUTE AN ISSUE OR NOT IN THE CASP SENSE IS PROBABLY MORE DEBATABLE THAN WHETHER NICARAGUAN FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR PER SE CONSTITUTES A MAJOR INTEREST. NEVERTHELESS, WASHINGTON'S SHARP EXECPTION TO MANAGUA'S POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS QUESTION IN ITSELF SUGGESTS VERY STRONGLY THAT IT CONTAINS THE INGREDIENTS OF A GENUINE ISSUE. WE DO NOT VIEW GREATER VENEZUELAN, ET AL, INFLUENCE HERE AS NECESSARILY AN

UNWHOLESOME PHENOMENON OR AS IN UTTER CONFLICT WITH OUR OWN INTERESTS. NEVERTHELESS, VENEZUELA WILL HAVE MORE PUNCH HERE IN THE FUTURE AND WILL LOBBY FOR MODIFICATIONS IN NICARAGUAN FOREIGN POLICY WHICH WILL BE AT ODDS WITH OUR OWN; SO WILL THE REST OF THE THIRD WORLD. SOMOZA WILL BE CAUGHT IN A DILEMMA BETWEEN HIS FEAR OF POLITICAL ISOLATION AMONG HIS PEERS ON ONE HAND AND HIS TRADITIONAL REGARD FOR THE U.S. ON THE OTHER. IN THIS COMPETITION WE ARE BOUND TO LOSE A FEW MORE GAMES THAN WE HAVE DONE HERETOFORE; BUT WE WOULD LIKE TO WIN AS MANY CLOSE ONES AS WE CAN. PRESUMABLY, U.S. POSITIONS ON ISSUES TABLED AT INTERNATIONAL SECRET

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FORA ARE FORMULATED OUT OF A SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF THE NET ADVANCEMENT OF OUR INTERESTS. IF SO, THEN IT WOULD SEEM TO BEHOVE OUR DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES TO LOBBY VIGOROUSLY IN PURSUIT OF SUPPORT FOR THESE POSITIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT IT DOES NOT WASTEFULLY DIMINISH OUR RESERVE OF DIPLOMATIC CAPITAL OR OTHERWISE BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. GENERALLY AND MOST TYPICALLY, IT HAS BEEN WASHINGTON WHICH HAS ARGUED FOR STRONGER BILATERAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE FIELD, USUALLY MORE PAROCHIAL IN ITS SENSITIVITY TO THE DANGERS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH PLEADS FOR CAUTION. IN THE CASE AT HAND, HOWEVER, THE CT WAS UNANIMOUS IN ASSESSING THAT THE U.S. HAD A SUFFICIENT MARGIN OF PROTECTION HERE TO INSURE THAT THE MORE VIGOROUS APPROACH RECOMMENDED BY IT WOULD PROBABLY HEAD OFF POTENTIAL NICARAGUAN DEFECTIONS WITH LITTLE, IF ANY, DAMAGE TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. GREATER PRESSURE ON NICARAGUA WHERE OUR INTERESTS ARE PERCEIVED AS LEGITIMATE BY BOTH SIDES WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT "UNDERCUT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM (SOMOZA) NEEDLESSLY". THE EMBASSY IS PRESUMABLY IN THE BEST POSITION TO MAKE THIS ASSESSMENT. MUCH MORE LIKELY TO UNDERCUT OUR RELATIONSHIP IS AN UNNECESSARILY HARSH LINE IN CASES WHERE THE GON IS DUBIOUS OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE U.S. CONCERN, THE MOST OUTSTANDING RECENT EXAMPLE BEING THE "SUGAR DADDY" DEMARCHE.

9. WE HAVE HEARD BEFORE THE SPECULATION THAT "AN OCCASIONAL DISPLAY OF INDEPENDENCE MIGHT ACTUALLY ENHANCE THE VALUE -- OF NICARAGUA -- BY MODIFYING THE PRESENT IMAGE OF EXCESSIVE AND

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EB-07 CU-02 INR-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 ACDA-05 AGR-05

AID-05 COME-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 OPIC-03 PC-01 PER-01

TRSE-00 USIA-06 /083 W

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P 051400Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7137

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MANAGUA 2149

UNABASHED NICARAGUAN DEPENDENCE ON THE U.S.". HOWEVER, WE HAVE USUALLY HEARD IT ON CASUAL OCCASIONS OVER A FEW MARTINIS AND NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF A POLICY DOCUMENT. IF WASHINGTON IS INDEED SERIOUS ABOUT THIS, THE EMBASSY CAN ACCOMMODATE IT UPON SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS. WE MIGHT ASK, OBITER DICTUM, WHETHER IO BUREAU PARTICIPATED IN THE PRE-IG AND APPROVED OF THIS LINE.

10. THE STATEMENT ABOUT "COMPROMISING THE HUMANITARIAN BASIS FOR OUR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE" PROGRAMS IN DISCUSSING ALTERNATIVES CONFUSES US. E MUST POINT OUT THAT THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF THE AID PRESENCE HERE CANNOT FULLY EXPLAIN TO THE SATISFACTION OF MOST PARTIES THE SHEER MAGNITUDE OF OUR INPUT AND THE STRONGER IDENTIFICATION WITH A LESS THAN FULLY DEMOCRATIC REGIME THEREBY. THE SUSPICION THAT THERE IS SOME FOREIGN POLICY QUID PRO QUO INVOLVED IS AMONG THE MORE INNOCUOUS INTERPRETATIONS GIVEN O OUR ASSISTANCE EFFORT BY THOSE HERE AND ELSEWHERE UNFRIENDLY TO SOMOZA. IN SUMMARY, WE REITERATE OUR RECOMMENDATION AGAINST THE COMPLACENT APPROACH SUGGESTED BY WASHINGTON, ALTHOUGH WE CONCEDE THAT THE REFERENCE TO EXPLICIT THREATS TO TRIM BACK AID PROGRAMS IN THE CASE OF DEFECTIONS OUGHT TO BE REMOVED.

11. C. ISOLATION OF THE AID PROGRAM: LACKING ANY STATED EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION FOR OUR RATEHR FORMIDABLE PRESENCE HRE, WE AR LEFT ONLY WITH VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN MANDATES TO AFFECT NICARAGUAN
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POLITICAL PROCESS AND TO PROMOTE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES. WHETHER BY ACCIDENT OR DESIGN, THE AID PROGRAM THEN HAS EMERGED IN THE PRE-IG VERSION OF THE CASP NOT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY, BUT AS OUR PRINCIPAL INTEREST HERE. WHILE GRANTED THAT THE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF

ASSISTANCE IN THE PAST FEW YEARS HAVE PROBABLY CREATED NEW INTERESTS WHERE NONE EXISTED BEFORE (E.G. EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF FUNDS BY THE GON WILL AFFECT THE U.S.T MAGE HERE AND ELSEWHERE), THE PRE-IG VERSION OF THE CASP GOES BEYOND THIS AND IMPLIES THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE IS NOW THE TAIL THAT WAGS THE DOG. WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE PURE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE AID PROGRAM, WE MUST DRAW SOME CONCLUSIONS DERIVING FROM THE FACT THAT MONEY IS BEING GIVEN FOR NICARAGUAN POOR AND NOT TO SOME OTHER COUNTRY'S. OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE SOME BUREAUCRATIC REASONS INVOLVED IN THES DECISIONS WHICH MAY NOT B SUSCEPTIBLE TO DISCUSSION HERE. BUT TO DIVORSE OUR MOST SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM HERE FROM OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IS BY BEING EITHER DISINGENUOUS OR QUIXOTIC, UNSATISFYING LOGICALLY AND APT TO ENCOURAGE THE SAME SUSPICION IT PRESUMABLY SEEKS TO ALLAY.

12. D. MISCELLANEOUS: WE WOULD LIKE WASHINGTON TO RECONSIDER ITS DELETION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE SEGMENT OF THE ANALYSIS SECTION. OUR FORMULATION ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH A POLICY REASON FOR THE MILGP'S PRESENCE IN NICARAGUA APART FROM ITS ROLE AS A SALESMAN OF DEFENSE MATERIALS AND AS A PUBLIC RELATIONS EMISSARY TO THE NATIONAL GUARD. IF THE JOB OF THE MILGP IS TO ASSIST THE GURD TO BECOME MORE PROFICIENT IN ITS OPERATIONS, THE ONLY POLICY RATIONALE WE COULD THINK OF IS THAT OF DIMINISHING THE POSSIBILITIES OF A SERIOUS INSURGENT THREAT. SHOULD SUCH A THREAT MA TERIALIZE, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD, IPSO FACTO, CALL FOR VARIOUS U.S. POLICY DECISIONS. ALTHOUGH ADMITEDLY THIS IS PHRASED IN CONTINGENCY LANGUAGE, WE KNOW OF FEW OTHER WAYS TO DISCUSS SECURITY PROBLEMS.

13. REGARDING THE BASIS FOR RESOURCES INDICATED FOR EXPORT PROMOTION ON P. 21, THE FIGURE OF \$2.5 MILLION REPRESENTS THE AMOUNT REQUESTED FOR FMS CREDIT. WE USED THIS AMOUNT UNDER OBJECTIVE ONE IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO WHAT WAS DONE BY BRAZIL IN THE MODEL CASP.

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14. THE EXPANSION OF PEACE CORPS ACTIVITIES WAS TREATED BRIEFLY IN THE AMBASSADOR'S OVERVIEW. AS NOTED THEREIN, THE INCREASE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL AND APPROVED BOTH BY THE AMBASSADOR HERE AND PC/W AT THE COUNTRY DIRECTORS' MEETING IN SAN JOSE. DETAILED PLANS WERE SUBMITTED TO PC/W SUBSEQUENT TO THE SAN JOSE MEETING.

15. WE ACCEPT THE MODIFICATIONS SUGGESTED FOR LAST PARAGRAPH PAGE 8 (WITH REGARD TO THE NON-MARXIST OPPOSITION) BUT PROPOSE THAT "SITUATION" BE DELETED AND BE REPLACED WITH "...THE REALITY OF POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES." WE ASSUME THAT SOME PERIODS WILL BE MOE AND OTHERS LESS CONDUCTIVE TO SUCH CONTACTS.

SHELTON

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, CASP, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, POLITICAL SUMMARIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MANAGU02149
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750196-1076
From: MANAGUA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750678/aaaactda.tel
Line Count: 386
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 STATE 113183
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 08 SEP 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <08 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <13 NOV 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NICARAGUA CASP
TAGS: PFOR, NU, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006